Abstract-The Internet has become a large platform where users can interact and share contents. In this context, content distribution systems (CDS) have been designed to satisfy users needs. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems have emerged as a prominent solution to speed up CDS. In this kind of distributed system, a particular interesting challenge refers to mechanisms employed to match user's interests and published contents. The efficacy of CDS depends on the expertise of publishers to properly describe contents, which comprises an important task to guarantee good quality of experience (QoE) to users. Massive attacks may harm CDS if countermeasure mechanisms are not considered to fight content pollution. The main objective of the thesis is to devise a mechanism to provide users a good QoE and reduce the effect of malicious interference. To achieve that, three main steps guided the research work presented in the thesis and summarized in this paper: (i) we proposed a novel strategy that operates conservatively to avoid wide pollution dissemination, (ii) we extended our previous solution to cope with the subjectivity regarding content descriptions, and last, (iii) we proposed a generic model to investigate massive attacks (including content pollution) and conservative approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a large platform where users can interact and share contents. These contents are typically personal files or third-party productions, which are published and downloaded by users based on their own interests [1] . Recent measurement reports have indicated that there is a noticeable number of content sharing activity taking place on the Internet, and that the exchange of multimedia contents accounts for an expressive traffic volume on Internet backbones [2] . For example, the content uploaded to YouTube in 60 days is equivalent to the amount that would have been broadcast for 60 years, without interruption, by NBC, CBS and ABC altogether [3] , [4] . To satisfy the demand for efficient content sharing, modern and robust content distribution systems (CDS) need to be deployed and maintained [5] .
In the context of the thesis and also of this paper, CDS are defined as systems used for sharing any kind of content on the Internet. Two categories of CDS are underscored as the most popular ones: file sharing and streaming systems. File sharing systems are used to store and disseminate any digital content, from documents and pictures to audios and videos. Since files are accessed only after the entire download is complete, there is no restriction regarding the order in which bytes are obtained.
In contrast, streaming systems are used to disseminate media (e.g., audio and/or video) in a timely manner in order to enable its prompt reproduction. If the content is being broadcast while recorded, the streaming system is classified as "live". Live streaming systems demand efficient network connections to disseminate high-quality streams on the Internet.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures have emerged as an alternative to speed up content dissemination in CDS [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . These architectures help balancing out the server bandwidth load. As a result, overload is removed from the network near the server, and the bandwidth requirements are spread over the network of users (peers). Instead of maintaining central entities to distribute content, P2P systems are designed so as peers can interact to share data and maximize their download bandwidth usage. The adoption of P2P architectures has attracted attention from the scientific community to some interesting challenges, namely network topology optimization [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , bootstrap mechanisms [14] , and service discovery [15] . One particular interesting challenge, in the context of the thesis, refers to mechanisms employed to match user's interests and published contents.
The efficacy of CDS depends on the expertise of publishers to properly describe contents, which comprises an important task to guarantee good quality of experience (QoE) to users. Since users typically have different opinions, similar contents may be classified with unrelated descriptions. Moreover, due to malicious behavior, attackers can publish contents with popular descriptions to deviate users' attention, obfuscate their queries, and/or promote marketing campaigns. Concrete evidences and statistics about "pollution 1 " have been widely reported in recent past (e.g., in BitTorrent communities [16] , [17] and KaZaa network [18] ). These evidences are underscored by a previous study [19] and the results of a survey we have carried out with administrators of BitTorrent communities, who informed that around 25% of contents being published are "polluted" and need manual intervention.
There has been substantial research on means to mitigate content pollution in CDS, leading to the proposal of several generic countermeasure mechanisms [20] , [21] , [22] . Although these are interesting strategies to fight pollution, they try to identify and isolate suspicious content after publication. However, attackers can easily generate multiple fake content and keep inserting malicious decoys. To circumvent that, alternative solutions focused on detecting, in addition to fake content, the users responsible for uploading them. One limitation of these solutions is that the time required to detect these copies and/or polluters may be long enough to allow wide pollution dissemination. Another limitation is the fact that previous approaches attempt to polarize contents in either polluted or not. Therefore, they do not take into account the inherent subjectivity behind the evaluation of shared contents.
The main objective of the thesis was to devise a mechanism to provide users a good QoE -by acting proactively in the early stages of content distribution life cycle -and reduce the effect of malicious interferences. To achieve that, three main steps guided the research work summarized in this paper. First, we proposed a novel strategy that operates conservatively to avoid wide pollution dissemination. Second, we extended it to cope with the subjectivity regarding content descriptions. Third, and last, we proposed a generic mathematical model to investigate massive attacks (including content pollution) and conservative approaches. To evaluate our solution, a set of experiments was carried out using both real tests and simulations. Results showed the importance of adopting security measures to mitigate malicious behavior in CDS. In the absence of countermeasure mechanisms, even a small proportion (10%) of attackers was able to subvert the system. The introduction of a conservative strategy in our work demonstrated the efficacy of delaying users in circumventing massive attacks.
Section II describes each of the aforementioned steps and underscores their contributions to the literature. Section III discusses and summarizes the achieved results. Section IV closes the paper with lessons learned and concluding remarks.
II. CONSERVATIVE STRATEGIES TO FIGHT MASSIVE ATTACKS IN CDS
The incremental steps toward a robust solution against massive attacks in CDS are detailed in this section. Different from previous approaches, which attempt to identify polluters and/or fake decoys only after evidences are produced, our strategy behaves proactively to detect and isolate suspicious content. Since lazy detections may allow wide dissemination of polluted content, it is of paramount importance to devise countermeasure mechanisms to mitigate massive attacks.
A. FUNNEL Model
The distinguishing aspect of our strategy is to start with a very low dissemination rate, growing quickly as long as positive feedback (towards the legitimacy of the content) is provided by users. For the sake of clarity, we describe the strategy, called FUNNEL, considering the dissemination of a single content version, since the strategy is independently applied to every content version published.
A binary voting mechanism is used to build the reputation of a given object in the community (R). When a user finishes retrieving the content, he/she issues a positive vote to testify the legitimacy of the downloaded version, or a negative vote to report the version as polluted. The content reputation is supported by the Subjective Logic [23] and is computed using the fraction of positive votes out of the total number of votes issued to a given version. The reputation, which is defined in the interval [0; 1], is expressed by Equation 1. Variables p and n represent, respectively, the number of positive and negative votes issued by users. In addition to the number of votes, the equation includes a constant factor a that defines the behavior when few votes are available: if p, n → 0, then R → a.
The value of R is used to establish the number of concurrent downloads allowed in a given instant, denoted as A. The value of A is calculated according to Equation 2 , as a function of the corresponding content reputation (R), and assumes a value in the discrete interval [A min , A max ] (with A min , A max ∈ N * ). In this context, A min denotes a lower bound, which guarantees a minimum number of downloads (when R → 0, A → A min ).
As soon as the perceived content reputation surpasses the reputation threshold r (i.e., when R ≥ r), downloads are not restricted and peers are free to download. Otherwise, content dissemination is ruled by the current value of A, being limited by A max -which denotes an upper bound for the number of downloads to be allowed by the strategy (when R → 1,
Three important properties hold for Equation 2:
• Property 1: For any r ∈ (0, 1] and R ≥ r, A = ∞; when so, the content will be assumed beyond suspicion and unlimited downloads will be allowed;
• Property 2: For any r ∈ (0, 1] and R < r, A = R × (A max − A min ) + A min , situation in which content dissemination will be ruled according to its perceived reputation;
• Property 3: When r = 0, A = ∞ regardless of R; when so, no control will be imposed and peers will be free to download the content, regardless of the perceived reputation.
The number of concurrent downloads actually taking place at any moment is denoted as D. The value of D is incremented when a download begins (or resumes), and is decremented when it ends (or is interrupted). Although D ≤ A is desirable, since both A and D fluctuate, it is possible that A drops and temporarily D > A. To establish if a new download is possible, the values of A and D are compared. If D < A (or R ≥ r), new downloads can be allowed.
B. DÉGRADÉ Model
As an important step towards increasing download quality in content distribution systems, this subsection presents DÉGRADÉ, a novel tag-based strategy to control the dissemination of undesired contents. Unlike existing solutions, DÉGRADÉ leverages social tagging system techniques to allow users to express their perception about downloaded contents in a flexible and accurate fashion. Furthermore, and key to our solution, it restricts the dissemination of contents when the uncertainty on the vocabulary describing them is high, and promotes their dissemination otherwise. DÉGRADÉ goes beyond the traditional binary polarization ("polluted" vs. "nonpolluted") of users' feedback in characterizing contents and provides a more effective way for users to express their "taste". The control strategy underneath manages to reconcile such "tastes" and downloads.
This strategy can be divided in two main components. The first one is the tagging component used by users to type in the set of tags associated to some content. The second one is the aggregator service, where the tags are stored and employed to build our solution. The tagging component allows users to annotate contents similarly to the popular Delicious bookmarking system. After each tag assignment, the aggregator service updates the content vocabulary and derives a variation metric used to determine whether the content vocabulary is stabilized.
Given a set T of n possible tags to assign to any content, we define a tag assignment through a vector of n binary elements indexed by those tags. So, for |T | = n, the i-th assignment is represented as a vector v i = v i,t1 , . . . , v i,tn , whose element v i,tj is set to 1 if the assignment contains a tag t j , and 0 otherwise. A sequence of assignments defines the content vocabulary, which represents the entire set of tag frequencies. Those frequencies are called proportions when normalized by the total amount of tags. Consider the matrix M with m assignments:
defines the proportion of a tag t k after the m-th assignment.
These proportions fluctuate as the number of assignments increases, but asymptotically they tend to stabilize [24] . The set of tag proportions is used to determine the variation level in the content vocabulary. Next, we present the metric that captures vocabulary variation, and the strategy to adjust the number of allowable concurrent downloads in face of its value.
Considering a window with m assignments v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m and a sequence of proportions Φ t = p 1,t , p 2,t , . . . , p m,t which reflects these assignments, we define the variation of a tag t in terms of the standard deviation of its proportions (σ t = σ(Φ t )). Several measures of dispersion, such as variance and range, could have been used instead. However, the variance presents a data unit with different scale, equals to the square of the original one, hindering its interpretation. The range, in turn, is not sufficiently robust because it represents an approximation of the dataset variability and is sensitive to boundary values.
The vocabulary variation (denoted as ∆ w ) is based on a recent subset of tag proportions. In order to capture the current state of the vocabulary after m assignments, a window is used to consider only the w most recent proportions. The ∆ w metric is calculated by summing the variation of each tag (σ t ) within the window, according to Equation 4 . The constant in the equation is used to normalize the metric and is explained in detail in the thesis [25] .
DÉGRADÉ aims at providing a reliable view of the content vocabulary -i.e., tag proportions have stabilized -reducing the probability that users retrieve contents with poor and insignificant descriptions. Rather than considering only an immediate description of contents, the history of assignments is employed to calculate the vocabulary variation (∆) and support the strategy to control downloads. In this context, the proposed model reuse the two variables previously introduced by FUNNEL: D and A. The value of A is defined based on an expected behavior, as described next. Let δ ∈ [0; 1) be a threshold parameter, and A min and A max the bounds of A while the strategy is running, we have that:
DÉGRADÉ adjusts the value of A according to ∆. When the variation gradually decreases and converges to δ, A will approach A max . If the variation is below the threshold, then DÉGRADÉ becomes inactive. The values of A and D are compared and DÉGRADÉ determines if download requests should be allowed. We introduce a transformation function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that defines how A fluctuates in terms of ∆. A deeper analysis about this function is presented in the thesis [25] . The list of requirements expressed earlier is summarized in Equation 5 .
C. Massive Attack Mitigation in CDS
This subsection presents a generic mathematical model to mitigate massive attacks in CDS. A clear benefit of designing a novel generic model is that the resulting solution tackles not only content pollution problems, but also other denialof-service (DoS) attacks. The previous models, FUNNEL and DÉGRADÉ, are generalized and the artificial delay imposed to users is determined by a set of mathematical functions. Users (peers) are henceforth referred as consumers, and CDS and service are used interchangeably throughout this subsection. Thus, the overall system comprises three main entities: service, contents, and consumers. The service is responsible for storing and indexing all available contents. Contents, in turn, are objects of interest that consumers wish to download. Consumers are users of the system. They access the service to search for and download contents.
The generic model considers that there is a service that hosts contents and a set of users (consumers and attackers) who want to join the system. Consumers try to access content and download it, whereas attackers aim at promoting poor QoE to consumers, e.g., posting wrong testimonials about content, publishing content with imprecise descriptions, flagging authentic content as inappropriate etc. In order to represent the behavior of users, a set of mathematical functions determines the amount of consumers and attackers arriving in the system per time unit. For the sake of generalization, a fluid-based model is introduced so that continuous functions are applied to describe accesses to contents.
At any given instant t, let functions λ c (t) and λ a (t) represent the arrival rate of consumers and attackers, respectively. Given these arrival rate functions, the definite integral from m to n, for example, represents the total number of users who arrived during the interval [m, n]. Therefore, Equations 6 determine the total number of consumers and attackers in the system until instant t f , i.e., m = 0 and n = t f .
To measure the QoE in the system, we define a metric in terms of the amount of attackers who join the system before each consumer. This represents the potential damage caused by malicious behaviors, since subsequent arriving consumers will experience a service potentially tampered by attackers, e.g., unbalanced votes issued, imprecise descriptions about contents, and network topology manipulation. Equation 7 combines both c and a to formalize this concept, called 'proportion of attackers' and represented by p.
To calculate the QoE at instant t f , defined in terms of the average proportion of attackers when consumers join the system, it is necessary to accumulate p for every arriving consumer λ c and divide it by the total number of consumers c(t f ). This metric, henceforth named Q, measures the overall QoE in the system and is calculated as shown in Equation 8 .
Given the functions that reproduce user arrivals and the QoE metric, it is possible to envisage a conservative strategy to "reshape" the arrivals and mitigate massive malicious joins in the system. To achieve that, the FUNNEL and DÉGRADÉ metrics (R and ∆, respectively) are replaced by a delaying function which determines the number of users allowed to join the system at a given instant. This function forces users to wait and increases the probability that consumers join before attackers, hence, protecting contents against malicious manipulations in the early stages of the distribution process. Two terms are employed with distinct meanings: while the term arrive refers to the act of arriving in the system to access some content, join is used when the access is actually granted.
Since the control strategy randomly selects users to access the system, it is known that the probability of a consumer or an attacker to be granted access to the system is directly related to their respective proportions waiting to join. Given the number of consumers and attackers waiting to join at instant t, represented by w c (t) and w a (t) respectively, the probability that a consumer or an attacker joins (C and A) is defined by the following Equations 9.
Let f (t) be a delaying function that represents the rate at which users are allowed to join the system at instant t. Equation 10 employs P [C] to determine the number of consumers actually joining the system, λ c . Similarly, Equation 11 employs P [A] to determine the number of attackers joining, λ a .
In order to measure the overhead imposed to the N first consumers due to the delaying strategy, a metric called average waiting time (W) is introduced. This metric is calculated by subtracting the times each consumer arrives from the times they join in the system and dividing this difference by N . Let tf and tf be the times when the N -th consumer arrives and joins the system, respectively. The definite integral of arrival and joining times multiplied by the corresponding functions, λ c and λ c , is employed to calculate W, as shown in Equation 12.
Distinct delaying functions produce different QoE (Q) and average waiting time (W). For example, a delaying function can be more restrictive by allowing only a few users to join in the beginning. In this case, users who arrive early experience long waiting times, but are more protected against attackers. Conversely, if the delaying function is more permissive in the beginning, users (including potential attackers) are allowed to join earlier and waiting times will be shorter.
III. ACHIEVED RESULTS

A. FUNNEL Evaluation
In order to prove the concept of our strategy, we first evaluated FUNNEL in a real testbed. The experiment reproduced a controlled BitTorrent community, where users join to download a content and cast a vote. Different proportions of attackers were introduced to investigate their impact on the conservative strategy. Furthermore, to measure the effectiveness in both polluted and non-polluted scenarios, we measued how long it took to each honest user to complete its download. Figure 1 illustrates the amount of time users remain online (up to completion) in both non-polluted and polluted scenarios (Figure 1(a) and 1(b), respectively). A pair (x,y) in the plot means that a fraction of users x remains online for up to y minutes in order to complete their download. Figure 1 (a) illustrates the behavior of the mechanism for non-polluted scenario. In this case, the lower the curves, the better. First, we notice that the curves 'No Control' and 'M = 0%' are similar. That is, when there are no attackers, the presence of the pollution control mechanism introduces a negligible overhead. More precisely, results indicate that the delays imposed by the mechanism are not larger than 10 minutes to 80% of peers.
When running an experiment with 2% of malicious peers, the mechanism receives votes against the legitimacy of the content (negative), which induces FUNNEL to slow down the dissemination of non-polluted content. This may be observed by the fact that, in comparison to the curve 'M = 0%', honest peers took at most 70 extra minutes to download the content. However, we notice that, to duplicate this delay, it takes five times more attackers (M = 10%).
Results regarding the polluted scenario are shown in Figure 1(b) . In the absence of control, 100% of peers complete the download of the polluted content in less than 50 minutes. In this case, the benefits of using FUNNEL are highly expressive: approximately 90% of peers consume more than 750 minutes (12.5 hours) to complete the download of the polluted content (curve 'M = 0%'). For the sake of legibility, the plots in the figure were limited in the y-axis. Please note, however, that the overall behavior of curves M = 0% and M = 2% remained unchanged, even past 15 hours of experiment. The mechanism also performs efficiently, controlling the dissemination of polluted content, even in the presence of 2% of malicious peers voting positively. When M ≥ 10%, the set of malicious users obtained success in promoting content dissemination; however, honest peers took approximately 600 minutes (10 hours) to obtain the 60 MB file, 12 times more than in the absence of FUNNEL.
B. DÉGRADÉ Evaluation
In order to evaluate DÉGRADÉ, we built a simulator and reproduced a scenario similar to the one used on FUNNEL evaluation. Since we designed DÉGRADÉ to use free annotations instead of a binary voting mechanism, we introduced a metric to capture the impact of malicious assignments on content vocabulary. This metric, called similarity metric, measures how close the vocabulary is to its final state at the instant users get access to the content being shared. Since we employ crawled data from the online bookmarking system Delicious.com, we can compare the vocabulary state when users join to the vocabulary resulting from this trace (for simplicity, we denote this final state as "vocabulary definition"). We apply the cosine similarity equation between both vocabularies and get a value between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 representing stronger similarity. Complementary metrics were also proposed and are discussed in the complete thesis [25] .
The set of box plots in Figure 2 shows the similarity metric for one trace obtained without (OFF) and with (ON) DÉGRADÉ. Starting with Figure 2 (a), we notice that the impact of DÉGRADÉ in the absence of attack is not significant. However, Figures 2(b) , 2(c) and 2(d) show that when attacks strike, DÉGRADÉ is highly efficient in reducing their negative impact. RND and TGT stand for 'random' and 'target', respectively. They represent two different attack strategies, in which attackers assign random tags (RND) or a immutable set of tags (TGT).
C. Evaluation of the Model to Mitigate Massive Attacks
In order to evaluate our generic model, we designed a flash crowd scenario (FC), in which consumers arrive in 24 hours (80% arrive in the first 5 hours). Additional scenarios and a detailed description of the evaluation are presented in the thesis [25] . Two delaying functions were used to evaluate the scenarios: CONSTANT and LINEAR. The CONSTANT function enforces a constant joining rate, whereas the LINEAR one enforces a linear rate. In this evaluation, the number of consumers was set to 3,000 and the proportions of attackers set to 30%. Moreover, attackers always arrive en masse before every consumer.
In order to perform a fair comparison across multiple scenarios, a normalized Q is introduced (Q norm ) as a scaled value of Q. It is calculated in terms of the worst and best possible values for Q, given a certain proportion of attackers. In this subsection we present results only for the extreme value of 30% of attackers, therefore the normalization may be disregarded. However, in the thesis, Q norm is necessary to enable a fair comparison even using different proportions. Figure 3 shows the relationship between W and Q norm for 30% of attackers. The first observation is that although the difference between Q norm is not greater than 0.1 for a given W in CONSTANT and LINEAR functions, the latter performs better than the former. It is also possible to notice that the CONSTANT function increases the Q norm metric to 0.7 when the average waiting time is 5 hours. This value is close to 0.8 for the LINEAR function. Results show that the quality of experience metric increases to 0.6 when the conservative strategy imposes a delay of less than 2.5 hours. This means that, on average, consumers join the system in the presence of much less attackers if compared to systems without countermeasure mechanisms. Additional investigations (presented in thesis) show that both CONSTANT and LINEAR functions delay users so that consumers represent majority of users all the time in the system. Moreover, the impact of waiting times is properly discussed in the thesis [25] .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we summarized the incremental steps carried out to defend our hypothesis: "delaying user's actions mitigates massive attacks and improves users' quality of experience." Based on an evolutive process towards a generic model to represent user's behaviors, a conservative strategy was designed and instantiated in multiple use cases. In a first iteration, we faced some challenges to design a robust strategy based on binary votes to fight content pollution in BitTorrent communities. In a second iteration, this strategy was improved to allow users to express their opinions through annotations, instead of only assigning positive and negative votes. Based on prominent results achieved using conservative strategies, in a third iteration, we generalized the proposed models to increase their applicability and allow further investigations about delaying functions.
A. Lessons Learned
In conclusion, the overall work presented in this paper underscored the importance of adopting security mechanisms to mitigate malicious behavior in CDS. In the absence of countermeasure mechanisms, we showed that even a small proportion (10%) of attackers was able to subvert the system. The adoption of a conservative strategy demonstrated the efficacy of delaying users in circumventing massive attacks. The simple, yet powerful, strategy managed to thwart attacks en masse and protect users against malicious interferences. The user's quality of experience was analyzed and results suggested that there is a trade-off between delaying users and their resulting experience. The current work presented in the thesis pushes the state of the art by investigating the content pollution problem and massive attacks under a different perspective. We focused on controlling the impact of massive attacks during early stages on systems' life cycle, which is a novel approach in the context of CDS.
The achieved results summarized in this paper enable further research and investigations about security mechanisms in content distribution systems. The conservative strategy presented in this paper may be instantiated in different contexts and systems. For example, a similar approach could be employed to mitigate vote manipulation in consensus algorithms. Furthermore, conservative strategies may also be employed to fight massive attacks in which malicious users upload junk data to content sharing systems. Finally, we emphasize that our model is flexible enough to be used as a complementary approach to existing solutions with minor efforts.
B. Outcome of the Thesis and Final Remarks
The full thesis can be downloaded from http://inf.ufrgs.br/ ∼ frsantos/files/thesis flaviosantos.pdf. The achievements presented in the thesis were published at renowned conferences and journals, namely, IEEE IM 2013 [26] , Elsevier COM-COM [27] , IEEE TNSM [19] , IEEE INFOCOM 2009 [28] , and IEEE NOMS 2010 [29] , receiving the Best Student Paper Award in the latter conference.
